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Thousands of infectious food-borne disease outbreaks 
(FBDO) are reported annually to the European Food 
Safety Authority within the framework of the zoonoses 
Directive (2003/99/EC). Most recognised FBDO occur 
locally following point source exposure, but only few 
are investigated using analytical epidemiological stud-
ies. In Germany, and probably also in other countries 
of the European Union, this seems to be particularly 
true for those investigated by local health authorities. 
Analytical studies, usually cohort studies or case–
control studies, are a powerful tool to identify suspect 
food vehicles. Therefore, from a public health and food 
safety perspective, their more frequent usage is highly 
desirable. We have developed a small toolbox con-
sisting of a strategic concept and a simple software 
tool for data entry and analysis, with the objective to 
increase the use of analytical studies in the investiga-
tion of local point source FBDO in Germany.
Introduction
Outbreak identification, investigation, and control 
are primary objectives for public health. The Directive 
2003/99/EC on the monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic 
agents of the European Parliament and of the European 
Council defines food-borne disease outbreaks (FBDO) 
as two or more human cases of the same disease and/
or infection […] and where the cases are linked, or are 
probably linked, to the same food source. FBDO, usually 
caused by infectious agents, occur frequently in Europe 
[1]. In 2010, for example, a total of 4,858 FBDO affect-
ing 58,083 persons (data excluding those of Spain) 
were reported to the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) [2]. Their effective control depends on the rapid 
identification of the suspected food vehicle from all the 
available epidemiological, microbiological, environ-
mental and other evidence and on preventing its fur-
ther consumption, e.g. by removing it from the market. 
From a food safety perspective, it is paramount to learn 
what went wrong during production and preparation of 
the food so that measures to prevent further outbreaks 
or sporadic cases can be implemented [3]. Most FBDO 
are recognised and handled locally [4], emphasising 
the necessity for local health authorities to be able to 
conduct timely epidemiological investigations, which 
can (but do not always have to) include analytical epi-
demiological studies, usually cohort studies or case–
control studies. Importantly, these studies increase 
the likelihood of successfully identifying the suspected 
food vehicle. [4]
However, analytical epidemiological studies are sel-
dom employed in the investigation of FBDO, particu-
larly in local outbreaks, where control measures are 
often prompted by descriptive epidemiology and prior 
knowledge, i.e. biological plausibility, of common food 
vehicles. In 528 of 4,858 (11%) FBDO reported to EFSA 
for 2010, the evidence for a suspected food vehicle 
was reported as being ‘strong’, i.e. usually based on 
better evidence than a suspected vehicle’s biological 
plausibility and on the fact that most or all of the cases 
had been exposed. Only in 148 of them (27%; 3% of 
all reported FBDO) had an analytical epidemiological 
study been conducted. The use of analytical epidemi-
ology varies widely across the Member States of the 
European Union (EU), and some countries seemingly 
do not use them at all [2]. In 2010 in Germany, reports 
on 439 FBDO with an identified causative agent were 
electronically submitted to the public health institute 
at national level, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI). In 40 
of these 439 (9%), the evidence implicating a suspect 
food vehicle or meal was considered to be strong, but 
only in two of the 40 (i.e. 5% of those with strong evi-
dence, and less than 1% of the total) had an analytical 
epidemiological study been reported, one by the state 
health department and one by a field epidemiologist 
trainee [5], both assisting local health authorities.
Obviously, barriers against employing analytical epi-
demiological studies in FBDO investigations exist. 
The reasons why analytical epidemiological studies in 
Germany are seldom employed are many and include 
lack of human or technical resources, conflicting public 
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health priorities, late outbreak detection (resulting in 
no new cases at the start of a possible investigation), 
and lack of experience in conducting such studies. In 
our experience, the greatest barriers are associated 
with three core activities in epidemiological outbreak 
investigations:
1. Use of long hypothesis-generating (trawling) 
questionnaires,
2. Use of specific, sometimes complex software for 
data entry and/or statistical analysis,
3. Identifying and interviewing healthy persons serv-
ing as reference population (in cohort studies or 
case–control studies).
All these activities are usually not used outside of 
outbreak investigations by local health authorities in 
Germany. Consequently, they require special resources, 
and some also require specific skills (points 2 and 3). 
To support local public health authorities in overcom-
ing some of these barriers (namely points 1 and 2), we 
have developed a toolbox that includes a strategic con-
cept and an electronic file (Linelist Tool) that allows for 
data entry and automatic analysis. We thereby hope to 
increase the use of analytical epidemiological compari-
sons in investigations of FBDO in Germany.
The concept
The concept of how to investigate epidemiologically 
a FBDO is based on the steps of an outbreak investi-
gation [6] as taught in many field epidemiology train-
ing programmes around the world (e.g. the European 
Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training 
(EPIET) or the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) of 
Figure 1
Simplified schematic for epidemiological investigation of foodborne disease outbreaks in Germany
FBDO: foodborne disease outbreaks.
a  Usually an institution, a restaurant or a social gathering. 
b  Infection period can be estimated for group of primary cases using the incubation period of the causal agent (if known), or those of typical 
FBDO agents.
c Additionally or even alternatively, the association of specific food items with illness may be rapidly assessed using binomial probability, 
provided that estimates on the prevalence of consumption of these food items in the general population are available or that their range can 
be reasonably guessed [9].



















(1) Verify outbreak, (2) confirm diagnosis, (3) define  case, (4) (active) case finding
(5)  Orient data in terms of time, place, and person (start with ‘place’)
(8)  Conduct an analytical epidemiological study   
(usually cohort or case–control study)
    - Select (’healthy’) reference population 
    - Systematic evaluation of  healthy persons‘ food history
    - Calculate food-specific odds or risk ratios
(6) Obtain menu records of likely infection periodb for:
(7) Systematic evaluation of (a selection of) primary cases‘ 
food history
 If one or few suspect food vehicles identified and / or
 If other risk factors (e.g. salad bar) are identified
(6) Design (or use) hypothesis-generating (trawling) questionnaire for:
(7) Systematic evaluation of (a selection of) primary cases’ food history       
 If one or few suspect food vehicles identified and / or
 If likely place(s) of exposure or point(s) of sale (e.g. supermarket) 
identified
(8) Conduct an analytical   
epidemiological study
      - analogous to (8) on the left sidec
(8) Product tracing investigations 
of suspect food vehicle(s) 
along the food chain 
(’epi tracebacks’)
a)   Determine symptom onset of cases 
(use diarrhoeal onset for most outbreaks)
b)  Construct an epidemic curve (Try to find temporal patterns. In 
conjunction with cases’ age and sex distribution, consider focusing 
on suitable subgroups)
a)  Determine symptom onset of cases 
(use diarrhoeal onset in most outbreaks)
b) Construct an epidemic curve










the United States). The concept has been adapted pri-
marily to distinguish outbreaks where a common local 
place of exposure can be identified, e.g. a social gath-
ering or an institution, and outbreaks where this is not 
the case. The concept is displayed in Figure 1. FBDO 
come in various shapes and sizes, and thus the con-
cept is oversimplifying (e.g. continuing common source 
outbreaks do occur in institutions, and the concept 
does not accommodate for them). By experience and 
for didactic purposes, it is assumed that most local 
outbreaks are recognised by a sudden increase in case 
numbers, and so the epidemic curve is suggestive of 
a point source transmission, indicating a single expo-
sure event.
The salient point is that in these outbreaks, menu 
records can often be used instead of long trawling 
questionnaires as the basis for hypothesis-generating 
interviews with cases. We advise local health authori-
ties to focus primarily on investigating local outbreaks 
with a point source exposure. The Linelist Tool should 
offer them assistance in their analytical epidemiologi-
cal investigation. In the rarer outbreaks where cases 
are geographically scattered, we advise them to seek 
assistance from public health authorities at the federal 
state or the national level, as these investigations are 
usually more time-consuming, complex and often not 
restricted to one jurisdiction.
The Linelist Tool
The Linelist Tool is a Microsoft Excel (Microsoft 
Corporation, Redmond, Washington) file consisting of 
several spreadsheets. The first spreadsheet (Linelist) 
allows for the entry of data collected from cases and 
healthy control subjects (Figure 2).
The other spreadsheets are completed automati-
cally, based on the data entered. In one spreadsheet, 
an epidemic curve of the outbreak is generated. This 
should help local investigators to determine the time 
period when exposure is likely to have occurred, and to 
identify cases that are likely to be primary cases, i.e. 
infected by a common source, to seek food histories 
from (a subset of) them. Other spreadsheets display 
univariable measures of association for each dichoto-
mous exposure, i.e. food vehicle-specific associations, 
expressed as odds ratios or risk ratios, depending on 
whether a cohort or case–control design is used (only 
responses coded as ‘yes’ or ‘no’ are included in the 
analysis). In addition to these estimates, correspond-
ing approximate 95% confidence intervals [7] indicate 
the precision of the estimation and can be used to 
assess statistical significance (Figure 3). 
We offer a short training course for local health 
authorities which we recommend users to complete 
before applying the tool in an outbreak investigation. 
The Linelist Tool is currently available only in German 
Figure 2
Linelist spreadsheet for entry of data collected on case-patients and control subjects in investigations of foodborne disease 
outbreaks in Germany
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language and can be downloaded at http://www.rki.
de/linelisttool. Planned future developments of the 
tool include a power table for unmatched case–control 
studies (based on case numbers and the proportion of 
cases exposed to the suspected vehicle) to inform local 
health authorities of an appropriate number of control 
subjects when deciding whether or not to conduct a 
case–control study. 
Discussion
Epidemiological investigations of FBDO, if conducted, 
seldom go beyond the evaluation of cases’ food his-
tories. If the prevalence of consumption of a food in 
the general population can be assumed to be low (e.g. 
raw milk in Germany) or is indicated by background 
data such as consumption surveys (e.g. water cress 
in the UK [8]), this may provide sufficient descrip-
tive epidemiological evidence to implicate a specific 
food vehicle, and more targeted investigations (e.g. 
food sampling) or control measures can be initiated. 
In these instances, delaying intervention measures 
because an analytical study has not been conducted 
or yet completed may put the public at unacceptable 
risk. More often than not, however, it remains unclear 
whether a food item frequently consumed by cases 
implicates the contaminated vehicle or merely reflects 
the popularity of the food in the source population. 
For illustration, in Germany in 2010, in 252 of the 399 
(63%) FBDO reported with ‘weak’ evidence, the only 
reported evidence implicating a food or meal was that 
‘the majority of cases consumed the implicated food’ (a 
field entry in the electronic outbreak report). Probably 
most investigations ended inconclusively, no interven-
tion occurred, and nothing could be learnt to inform 
improvements in food safety. To make matters worse, 
in some FBDO more than one food may be found to 
have been frequently consumed by cases. Irrespective 
of whether there are one or more such vehicles, an ana-
lytical epidemiological comparison is necessary to dis-
tinguish between popular foods and those associated 
with being a case.
We have developed a simple data entry and analy-
sis tool for basic epidemiological comparisons in the 
investigation of point source FBDO. The main advan-
tages of the tool are speed and ease of use. It only 
requires standard office software and the file is small 
enough to run on most computers. It does not require 
knowledge of specific statistical software (e.g. R, SAS, 
SPSS, Stata), but data can easily be imported by such 
software if more sophisticated analyses are needed. 
The software tool has already proven useful in a large 
norovirus outbreak linked to contaminated frozen 
strawberries [10], for which studies were completed, 
including analysis, within one day. In addition to FBDO, 
the tool can be used for the investigation of other out-
breaks, e.g. of vaccine-preventable diseases. However, 
the tool may not be as suitable for the investigation 
Figure 3
Spreadsheet ‘Cohort study’ with 2x2 tables displaying univariable measures of association for each dichotomous exposure in 
investigations of foodborne disease outbreaks in Germany
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of geographically diffuse outbreaks where exposure 
lists are not readily available and where investigators 
initially rely on hypothesis-generating interviews with 
cases to identify exposures of interest that can be fur-
ther investigated by an analytical study. Most reported 
FBDO in Europe with strong evidence for a food vehicle 
involve only a single place of exposure, implying that 
most of them are investigated by local health authori-
ties. Furthermore, analytical epidemiological studies 
are seldom conducted in FBDO in Europe, considering 
the large number of FBDO reported to EFSA. We there-
fore believe that this starter kit may be useful in other 
countries of the EU and welcome suggestions and feed-
back for its further improvement. 
As much as we are advocating the use of a simple anal-
ysis tool in investigations of local point source FBDO, 
we advise judicious use and data interpretation, and 
emphasise the importance of considering analytical 
epidemiological evidence in the context of all other 
available evidence, e.g. microbiological evidence and 
product-tracing evidence. It is important to note that 
the tool has purposely been kept simple and permits 
only univariable comparisons. The results are a start-
ing point for further, more targeted, investigations to 
identify the ingredient of the implicated meal carrying 
the causal agent. These investigations could include 
more detailed statistical analysis, further analytical 
studies, additional food histories, and environmental 
investigations, as well as food sampling and product 
tracing. At least some of these investigations are nec-
essary to identify a suspected vehicle and where and 
when contamination with (or multiplication of) the 
causative agent occurred.
We acknowledge that analytical epidemiological stud-
ies are not a universal remedy, and not all FBDO lend 
themselves to an analytical investigation. For exam-
ple, some FBDO are small, which hampers meaningful 
studies. Among them are those that occur in a sin-
gle household (often ascertained in the German sur-
veillance system). It is difficult to provide a numeric 
threshold for when an analytical study should be con-
ducted because the decision depends on many factors, 
such as the dynamic of the outbreak or severity of ill-
nesses. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that in 
2010, 23 FBDO were reported in Germany, each with at 
least 20 human cases, but evidence from an analyti-
cal study had been reported for only one. This number 
of outbreaks is likely to be an underestimate because 
a causative agent is not always identified in FBDO. In 
such cases, information on the outbreaks is often not 
transmitted from the local level via the state health 
department to the RKI. The fact that a causative agent 
has not (yet) be identified in a FBDO should not hin-
der the use of the tool; clinical case definitions may 
be perfectly adequate alternatives to microbiological 
confirmation [10,11]. Epidemiologically identifying a 
suspected vehicle enables better targeted searches 
for the causative agent in food samples. In addition, it 
may allow estimating the incubation period, which may 
provide crucial hints at the aetiological agent, thereby 
informing microbiologic investigation of human cases. 
Again, the norovirus outbreak linked to frozen straw-
berries is an excellent example [10].
Investigation of FBDO requires adequate resources, 
which is challenging in times where budget deficits 
have already left their footprint on public health sur-
veillance in many countries. However, surveillance of 
FBDO is necessary for understanding the epidemiology 
of foodborne diseases [4] and to serve the develop-
ment of public health policies on food safety [12,13] in 
a systematic and more unbiased fashion than focus-
sing on published outbreaks [14]. The higher the pro-
portion of FBDO with credibly identified food vehicles, 
the more valid is the evidence base provided by them.
We hope that by providing a simple software tool and 
by guiding local health authorities on how and which 
FBDO to investigate, more analytical studies in FBDO 
investigations will be conducted, and as a conse-
quence, a suspected vehicle will more often be identi-
fied. In the long run, it is also important to strengthen 
the epidemiological skills of local health authorities 
so that more detailed epidemiological analyses can be 
conducted independently. 
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